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1 THE POSTWAR WESTERN SOCIOLOGY
The institutionalization of sociology emerged alongside the birth of a newworld order at the end of the SecondWorld
War. The military defeat of fascism and the configuration of a bipolar power shaped sociology in the fifties. The social
sciences were urged to provide a comprehensive understanding of recent catastrophic events, as well as skills and
techniques to prevent further disorders: the social order was considered to be fragile, as the threat of war and social
convulsions remained on the horizon. As Christopher Lasch remembers:
The mass media have tried to idealize the fifties, in retrospect, as an age of innocence. They did not seem that
way to me or to most of my contemporaries. A chronic state of international emergency led to the erosion of civil
liberties at home and the militarization of American life. (Lasch, 1991, p. 25)
The “chronic state of international emergency,” the result of increasing tension between the USA and the USSR, and
intensified by the revolutionary events in China in the late 1940s and the proclamation of the Truman doctrine and
McCarthyism in the USA, led to an increasing militarization of everyday life worldwide. One of the opening scenes
of Europa 51, directed by Roberto Rossellini, deals with this belligerent atmosphere: after hearing that Andrea Casati
(Ettore Giannini) is a journalist, one of the guests at a dinner party asks him if there will be war or peace and then adds
that she thinks another war will begin. This scene was shot six years after the end of the war, and it is indicative of how
fears concerning a newwar prevalent among Europeans.
The trauma of the war and the fear of its recommencement resulted in the repositioning of sociology within uni-
versities and governments. After being institutionalized during the 1920s, academic sociologywas in fact consolidated
during the 1950s (Gouldner, 1972, p. 157), with the expansion of social sciences departments, institutes of research,
and, most importantly, because of an increase in financial resources. In theWest asmuch as in the East, sociology came
to be used as an instrument of state policy, both in relation to domestic problems and as an instrument for international
influence and prestige (p. 158). According to Gouldner, the rise of the welfare state was followed by the development
of a scientific and technical apparatus, in which sociology was included:
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ThemodernWelfare State and its accelerated support of academic sociology are the responses of a modernmid-
dle class which is both entrenched and threatened. No longer living under the shadow of restorationism, it is
a middle class that has great influence on the society and state apparatus. At the same time, this middle class
is threatened by the development of international communism and by the collapse of its influence abroad. It is
threatened also by growing internal crises at home, by the demands of dissident social strata, like the racially
subjugated, the students, the welfare dependents. (Gouldner, 1972, p. 161)
This postwar middle class believed that it was possible to solve the “social problem” (i.e., the “demands of dissident
social strata” and “thewelfare dependents”) through expert administration and the development of social engineering.
This configuration was an answer to the fears of another war and to the rise of Communism. The main agenda, then,
both the United States and in Europe was the maintenance of the new social pact. In this context, the development of
academic sociology was also driven by the need of contain social struggles and conflicts.
Whereas social sciences in USSR were based a certain interpretation of Engels and Lenin’s dialectical materialism,
western sociology—namely, the one that emerged at the University of Chicago and later at Harvard—was predom-
inantly functionalist (Gouldner, 1972, p. 157). The centrality of Talcott Parsons’ ideas corresponded to the political
demand for order, since functionalism conceived of society as an increasingly stable totality, with its ownmechanisms
that re-establish equilibrium. Robin Celikates includes Parsons’ approach under the general term “consensus theory,”
in opposition to “conflict theory,” which will be discussed later. According to Celikates, the consensus theory is based
on four basic assumptions:
(1) Societies are relatively stable social orders; (2) The elements of these orders—individuals and social groups—
are in a kind of state of equilibrium or balance. (3) All elements within the whole contribute to its functioning. (4)
Societies integrate themselves through consensus on common values and norms. (Celikates, 2007, p. 214–215)
Understood in this way, Parsons’ social system is a totality in relative equilibrium, where its elements contribute for
its maintenance, and it expressed the image of stability that was desired by the postwar middle classes referred to by
Gouldner.
In 1951, Talcott Parsons andEdwardShilswroteTowards aGeneral Theory of Action (Parsons&Shils, 1951), a paradig-
matic work for functionalist sociology. It described society as composed of institutions, in which individuals were
inserted through functions. In these systems, individuals had “institutionalized roles” and, as a consequence, “confor-
mity expectations.” Thus understood, institutions are a set of roles graded in authority andbasedon “moral consensus.”
Parsons andShils claimed that social order is not the result of coercionor power, but is primarily brought about through
shared values, which “bind a society together, for what is socially expected becomes individually needed” (Mills, 1968,
p. 31). The institutionalization of these values ensures the standards of commitment of individuals and the internaliza-
tion of norms. From the consensus-theoretical perspective, institutions are moral or symbolic spheres. Social patholo-
gies emerge from the inadequacy of institutional mechanisms of integration and the undermining of moral disposition
for consensus. For this reason, Parsons and Shils argued that the economic dimension of society is not the decisive
determination. Gouldner points this out:
Functional sociology conceives itself as a science of purely “social” relationships, which premises that social order
can be maintained regardless of the level and distribution of economic gratifications, and thus treats economic
arrangements as “givens.” (Gouldner, 1972, p. 343)
In this sense, for Parsons, society is made up of pure “social relationships,” and integration is a matter of moral
motivation, of social actors’ “value-orientation,” and has little to do with economic reparations. But this theoretical
model soon seemed inadequate to the demands of its time, since economic compensations were in the core of the
welfare state. Whereas functionalism considers moral commitment as the crucial condition for social stability, social
integrationwas being guaranteed in reality through progressive income taxation, democratic accountability, and social
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leveling. But before analyzing the decline of the functionalist paradigm, it is important to examine one of its most
influential outcomes inWestern sociology: themodernization theory.
Parsons and other sociologists considered “modernization” the general tendency to a harmonic state of affairs, to in
which all humanity converged. He describes it as a “wide consensus,” as it follows:
… Underneath the ideological conflicts [between capitalism and communism] that have been so prominent,
there has been emerging an important element of wide consensus at the level of values, centering in the com-
plex we often refer to as “modernization.” (Parsons apud Gilman, 2003, p. 103)
Modernization was thus understood as an automatic and broad process, regardless of the prevalent economic system
(communism or capitalism). According to its theorists, “impersonal features”—such as urbanization, instruction, and
mass communication—would systemically lead archaic ways of life to homogeneous and equalitarian situations (Lasch,
1991, p. 158). Ultimately, it would provide traditional societies with the resources for what Parsons would later call
in the 1960s “a general process of adaptive ‘upgrading’, including economic takeoff to industrialization, democratiza-
tion via law, and secularization and science via education” (Parsons apud Alexander, 1995, p. 11). That is what, in this
context, came to be known as the “convergence thesis.”
According to this view, replacing old standards and habits by “better ones” would result in a situation of homogene-
ity worldwide, which would finally lead to progress. This “systemic” process was to be replicated in various areas of life
and territories of the world by experts and technicians from several fields. Modernization was broadly used as a the-
oretical framework to understand post-war changes in impoverished parts of the world—and, eventually, intervene in
these areas (Gilman, 2003, p. 94). In spite of being sometimes characterized as a “spontaneous” development, it con-
sisted in a highly stratified process, guided by a scientific elite. Parsons, for example, assumed that an increasing com-
plex system supposed greater differentiation and stratification of its elements. In this sense, he argues that “systems
of stratification in certain respects are seen to have positive functions in the stabilization of social systems” (Parsons,
1949, p. 26). In other words, the good functioning of the social machinery supposed that each element has a certain
functionwithin the hierarchical gradation of the system.1 Due to this sharp elitist perspective, the communication spe-
cialist Ithiel de Sola Pool had called themodernization theorists “mandarins of the future” (Gilman, 2003, p. 8).
In a speech given in 1959, in NewYork, Shils defined “modernization” with remarkable comprehensiveness:
In the new states “modern”means democratic and equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced and sovereign.
“Modern” states are “welfare states,” proclaiming the welfare of all the people and especially the lower classes as
their primary concern. (…) Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states is, above all, equali-
tarian. (…) It believes the progress of the country rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowl-
edge. (…) All this requires planning and the employment of economists and statisticians, conducting surveys to
control the rates of savings and investments, the construction of new factories, the building of roads and harbors,
the development of railways, irrigation schemes, (…). “Modernization” means being western without the onus of
following the West. It is the model of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus.
(Shils, apud Gilman, 2003, p. 2)
According to Shils, the historical trajectory towards modernity is based on democratic mechanisms, the expertise of
technicians, and policies that aim for equalization. This would lead the entire world to western standards without the
“onus of following theWest.” At this point, one can understandwhy “modernization”was frequently used as a synonym
for “westernization” or “Americanization” in opposition to “Sovietization” (Lerner apud Alexander, 1995, p. 49). After
all, this early post-war concept cannot be detached from the international ideological conflict. As Nils Gilman puts it:
Understood on its own terms, modernization theory was the fruit of American social scientists’ effort to build
a comprehensive theory not only for understanding what was happening in postcolonial regions, but also for
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promoting change that would make these regions become more like “us”—and less like the Russians or the
Chinese. (Gilman, 2003, p. 3)
Interestingly, by the 1950s, a significant number of western sociologists considered that the modernization process
was the clear demonstration for the fact that the differences between capitalism and communismwere being increas-
ingly dissolved. They believed that by implementing planning policies, western nations were not pure forms of cap-
italism any longer. According to Howard Brick, a kind of “post-capitalist” (or even “post-economic”) perspective was
widespread among sociologists at the time. In 1954, Raymond Aron claimed that “socialism ceased to be a myth in the
West since it had become part of reality” (apud Brick, 2006, p. 6) and Parsons stated that the dichotomy between cap-
italism and communism was no longer applicable because American society was not simply capitalist any more (Brick,
2006, p. 20).
2 THE CRITIC’S (ALMOST) LONELY VOICE
Nevertheless, some critical theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno never subscribed to these interpretations. His criti-
cisms ofmodernization theory and of functionalism in general convergedwith themomentwhen this theorywas being
increasingly questioned. The protest movements against the Vietnam war that took place during 1968, as well as the
civil rights struggles in theUSA and the liberationwars in the colonies had an important impact on the postwar consen-
sus among themiddle classes. Adorno became a leading theoretical reference for the protesting youth inGermany due
to his permanent skepticism and critical attitude towards the promises of welfare andmodernization.
Indeed, Adorno never considered capitalism to be on the brink of being overcome, nor had capitalism ceased to
be the central concept for a theory of society. On the opening address to the 16th German Sociological Congress
(1968), he stated very clearly that at no point in the history of capitalism did the market operate without bonds, as the
liberal doctrines always supposed (or dreamed about). According to him, capitalismwas not being transformed by state
interventions, nor was it being transcended, on the contrary:
Economic intervention is not, as the older liberal school believed, an alien element grafted on from outside, but
an intrinsic part of the system, the epitome of self-defense. Nothing could provide a more significant illustration
of the concept of dialectic. (Adorno, 2003, p. 122)
Adorno did not perceive social protection and free market as two separated poles, an insight that he shared with his
contemporary, Karl Polanyi.2 Similarly, Adorno considered that these two social forces reinforced one another dialec-
tically, in such a way that state intervention and large-scale planning rescued the capitalist order countless times from
the anarchy of commodity production. It is sufficient to remember that the thirty “golden years” in the 20th century
Europewere the longest period of sustained growth in capitalist history. In the same sense, Habermas pointed out that
theWelfare State pact consisted in successfully combining capitalistic expansion and state intervention:
Welfare-state mass democracy is an arrangement that renders the class antagonism still built into the economic
system innocuous, under the condition, however, that the capitalist dynamics of growth, protected by measures
of state intervention, do not growweak. (Habermas, 1985, p. 350)
Thus, state intervention was not responsible for transcending capitalism, but for saving it. The generalized idea that
capitalism would be overcome gradually, as Jean Jaurès had suggested, in the early 20th century, with his maritime
metaphor that described the advent of socialism—suggesting that capitalism would be overcome in the long run
through successive reforms in such a way that one would not notice when socialism will already be a reality3—would
be nothingmore thanwishful thinking.
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For modernization was supposed to be the main analytical character of social reality, its features, such as industri-
alization, were also elevated into predominant concepts. Nevertheless, by contrast in the 16th German Sociological
Congress, whose subject was “Late capitalism or industrial society?,” Adorno argued that capitalism, however modi-
fied, continued to be the central determining factor in society, against thosewho argued that the concept of capitalism
had been rendered obsolete (Adorno, 2003, p. 111). Furthermore, he emphasized the centrality of the concept due to
the fact that “exchange society” still has an objective reality and a universal coercive force (p. 113). In Adorno’s words
Without making use of capitalism as a key concept, these weighty facts could only be interpreted at the cost of
violent and arbitrary distortions. Human beings continue to be subject to domination by economic process. Its
objects have long since ceased to be just the masses; they now include those in charge and their agents. (Adorno,
2003, p. 116)
In otherwords, whereas some sociologists continued to utilize concepts such as “modernization” or “industrialization,”
Adorno believed that capitalism is still the mainline for any analysis of the social totality. This is precisely the reason
why thepromises of themodernization thesis cannot be fulfilled: capitalistic contradictions hinder technological devel-
opments that could lead humanity to a situation of widespread abundance. Adorno emphasizes that the end of basic
deprivation is only possible through a structural change in social order. In that sense, he says in the article “Progress”
(1969):
Material needs, which long seemed to mock progress, have been potentially eliminated; thanks to the present
state of the technical forces of production no one on the planet needs to suffer deprivation anymore. Whether
there will be further want and oppression—which are the same thing—will be decided solely by the avoidance of
catastrophe through the rational establishment of the whole society as humanity. (Adorno, 2005, p. 144)
Adorno did not deny that the general material conditions were sharply better for the lower classes than 20 years
before—at least in central Europe, but he did not interpret this fact as an indication that capitalism was providing the
improvement of general material conditions. According to Adorno, the fact that millions of people still starve, despite
the most advanced technological condition, indicated that “modernization” was not as uniform or rational process as
it seemed. As a consequence, the common claim that modernization is a “systemically convergent” process, according
to which every country would gradually progress towards one and the same point of homogeneity was, again, wish-
ful thinking. In “Society” (1965), Adorno argues that: “Within the exchange society, the pre-capitalist remnants and
enclaves are by no means something alien, mere relics of the past: they are vital necessities for the market system”
(Adorno, 1970, p. 149). The fact that modernization was a highly selective kind of development was gradually becom-
ing clear, something which was first acknowledged by the student movements.
3 GOVERNING THROUGH CONFLICT
Asmentionedbefore,Celikatesopposes the consensus theory,which includesParsons’ functionalism to conflict theory,
associated with theorists of different traditions such as Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber. To differentiate
conflict theory, the author names its four basic assumptions:
(1) Social orders are constantly being altered and can therefore only be understood from a historical perspec-
tive; they do not correspond to an ideal type and do not develop towards one; (2) Societies consist of elements—
individuals and social groups—that have a conflictive relationship to one another; (3) This relationship generates
permanent social change; (4) Social integration is always also dependent on domination, coercion and symbolic
violence and therefore cannot take place alone or only primarily by consensus. (Celikates, 2007, p. 215)
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In this outline, it is possible to see how emphatically conflictive society is characterized. Whereas for Parsons,’ social
systems tended towards equilibrium, conflict theorists conceptualized them as inevitably agonistic, since coercion and
domination are not eliminated from the system. They are, on the contrary, dynamic elements inherent to historical
development. Nonetheless, these two strands have common principles, such as the methodological primacy of partial
structures (groups) instead of large-scale structures (society) and the emphasis on system structures. The crucial dif-
ference is that one stresses the possibility of consensus and the other the latency of conflict.
Conflict theory emerged during the 1950s as an attempt to find ways to solve internal conflicts in a governmental
context. Parsonsianism had become partially obsolete because it theorized that social system does not need a
centralized power, because it is self-sustainable. “The infrastructure of Parsonianism remains pre-Keynesian, insofar
as it conceives of the relations among institutions, or actors on the tacit model of a spontaneously equilibrated
laissez-faire economy rather than of a state-managed welfare economy” (Gouldner, 1972, p. 162). Moreover, by
conceptualizing social structure idealistically as highly stable and immutable complexes, Parsons could not provide
a convincing account of disruptions that eventually occur within the system. In this sense, early functionalism
was inadequate for administrative proposals, as it was evident that social reality was not tending spontaneously
towards harmony. A static model had only poor analytical capacity to guide government actions and to give it
legitimation.
In an article of 1950, that was considered to be inaugural (Krysmanski, 1971, p. 15) Jessie Bernard stated that her
colleagues, theAmerican sociologists, hadneglected the conflict theory to avoid being confusedwithMarxists or “apol-
ogists for the conflict.”Making explicit the highly political character of the new sociological field, she claims that: “If we
learn about conflict, we disarm the conflicting parties; they are exposed, vulnerable. Until people knew about Com-
munist tactics, the latter worked effectively; when exposed, they lost much of their potency” (Bernard, 1950, p. 16).
Interestingly, the first text of themodern conflict theoryuses amilitaristic terminology: it discusses “disarming” conflict
parties, making them “exposed” and “vulnerable.” Hence the idea of neutralizing conflicts, whichwould bewidespread in
theorisations of the welfare state, derived from the battlefields.
Thus it can be argued that “the policy-oriented use of social science by governments both for welfare and warfare
purposes” (Gouldner, 1972, p. 345). The conflict theory, in turn, had a strong empirical perspective, being conceived of
as an instrument to manage groups with opposite interests. In the article “On the present state of German sociology”
(1959), Adorno analyzes the state of affairs of various fields of the sociology in his country, and already criticizes the
“practical function for administrative purposes” that characterized modern sociology, taking as a paradigm the sociol-
ogy of industry (Betriebssoziologie). This strand also arose in the postwar years and was very similar to conflict theory,
although more focused on the tension between employers and employees. According to Adorno, the “social question”
was reduced to the pure problem of “human relations” of a company (Gesammelte Schriften [GS] 8, p. 514). During the
industrial-boom of the 1950s, this theory thus gave conceptual means by which labor conflicts within a factory could
beminimized.
Like conflict theorists, industry sociologists refused to see social conflict as an accident to be prevented; instead,
they considered it as constitutive of the labor world. By doing so, they emulated and transfigured the Marxist idea of
struggle. On this matter, Adorno argued that, as an empirical field, it had taken advantage of “the tacit dissociation
from Marx’s theory, which had resulted, on the one hand, from the history of German social democracy, and, on the
other, from the confiscation and demagogic falsification of dialectical materialism by the Russian permanent dictator-
ship” (GS 8, p. 518). The vacuum promoted by the “falsification” of Marxist theory and the dissociation between the
Social Democratic Party and theworkers gaveway to a “worthless empirical sociology,” which instead of criticizing the
contradiction between social classes, naturalized it as an unavoidable social feature.
According to Adorno, the “empiristic-positivistic turn of the German sociology” is characterized by a “resignative
classification under the superiority of existing conditions.” In this sense, he held that a great part of predominant soci-
ology, including Parsons’ functionalism, was an apology for existing conditions. Adorno expressed his bitterness about
the great influence American sociology had in Germany4:
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It [the consciousness] enchants itself from the point of view of the better functioning of the social machinery into
something desirable. It is not for nothing that the dichotomy of functional and dysfunctional is the highest to
which the work of Talcott Parsons rises, which is beginning to have an effect in many places in Germany today.
(GS 8, p. 508)
The pernicious influence of functionalist sociology could be seen, among other things, in the idea that the good func-
tioning of the “social machinery” is something to be achieved. Although Adorno had criticized functionalism, he recog-
nized a common ground with his own thought: that is, in the positing of the primacy of structures over positive facts.
But on a closer examination, this resemblance becomes problematic. According toAdorno, the functionalist theory had
a fetishized perspective about these structures, treating them as a necessity. Dialectics, on the contrary, is “overborne
by the painful dominance of these laws does not glorify them but criticizes them” (Adorno, 2003, p. 113). When Marx
discovered “structural laws,” such as the law of value and the law of accumulation, he showed how they embody their
own negation, that is, its potential of crisis—something that the functionalist theory could not admit.
Finally, in dialectics, social structures are not patterns in which sociological findings can be applied free from con-
tradiction. On Adorno’s view, dialectics does not consist in projecting its own categories into the world, constituting
a coherent whole. That is to say that the dialectics does not “dismiss contradictions as errors in logic and attempt to
eliminate them by ensuring the coherence of the scientific framework” (p. 114). It is therefore more capable of cap-
turing the contradictions and antagonisms that constitute its object. But because functionalism—and positivism in
general—impute certain continuity between principles of knowledge (such as the law of noncontradiction) and reality
(antagonistic totality) it is incapable of grasping the antagonistic core of social order.
In “Sociology and Psychology,” Adorno addresses the problem of antagonism between individual and society and
criticizes Parsons’ Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure: while Parsons’ methodological scheme supposes a harmonic
continuity between the particular and the general structures, in a progressivemovement, Adorno recognizes an essen-
tial antagonism (Adorno, 1967, p. 69). “Parsons has to pay a price for his conceptual harmony: his notion of integration,
a positivist version of the (idealist) identity of subject and object, leaves room for an irrational society powerful enough
to shape its subjects from the outset” (p. 70). In other words, the positivist belief that the categories of knowledge
correspond perfectly to reality results in a compromise with the current unfair state of society.
The same kind of criticism is developed in a different approach in the article Remarks on social conflict today (1968),
written by Adorno and Ursula Jaerisch. They carry out a critique of ideology on modern conflict theory, which tried
to differentiate itself from consensus theory, that had characterized the conceptions of modernization until then.
The most prominent representatives of this relatively new field were Lewis Coser (in the United States) and Ralf
Dahrendorf (in Germany). They interpreted the conflict between the so-called “interest groups” from a functionalist
perspective, as a motor for structural changes in society. According to Coser, modern conflict theory emerged from
Georg Simmel’s essay “Conflict” (Streit), whose central thesis suggests that conflict is a form of socialization:
This means essentially that, to paraphrase the opening pages of Simmel’s essay, no group can be entirely harmo-
nious, for it would then be devoid of process and structure. Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dis-
sociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors. (Coser,
1964, p. 31)
In thisway, Coserwanted to distinguish conflict theory fromParson’s theory,which assumed that conflictswere always
causedby somedysfunctionality that could be remediated. Following Simmel, Coser, aswell asDahrendorf, interpreted
social conflicts as necessary factors in development and integration. For Adorno, these theorists gave continuity to
Simmel’s formal sociology, understanding conflict as an unquestionable attribute of society.5 This hypostasis was even
expressed ontologically: “wherever there is human life in society, there is conflict,” thus societies are regarded as not
differing by the presence or absence of conflicts, but only “in the violence and intensity of conflicts” (Dahrendorf, 1965,
p. 171).
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Unlike those sociologists referred to by Jessie Bernardwho never engaged in conflict research, due to fears of being
confused with Marxists, theorists of conflict focused on conflicts in order to make them relatively less threatening to
systemmaintenance. “An open society that allows internal conflicts onmany fronts protects itself from the danger of a
single conflict calling into question the basic consensus” (Coser apud Krysmanski, 1971 p. 127).With thesemilitaristic
words, Coser argues that, by inserting an aspect of chronic (thoughmanageable) instability into the functionalist equi-
librium, the system could become less susceptible to a sudden, single, profound, and potentially drastic rupture. That is
why an “open society” would be safer than a closed one.6
Although Adorno also pointed out the conflictive character of sociability, he has made serious criticisms of conflict
theory in the last few years of his life. He argues that, from a critical standpoint, the antagonistic social structure leads
to the possibility of society tearing itself apart and, for that reason,must be overcome. That is to say that the antagonis-
tic character is not essential to sociability in general. In contrast to Coser andDahrendorf Adorno does not hypostatize
the conflict as a fixed or ontological category with which society can be understood. In his 1965 article “Society”:
The process of socialization [Vergesellschaftungsprozeß, Y. A.] is not something that takes place beyond social
conflicts and antagonisms, or in spite of them. It works through those antagonisms themselves, the latter, at the
same time tearing society apart in the process. For in the institution of exchange there is created and reproduced
that antagonismwhich could at any time bring organized society to ultimate catastrophe and destroy it. (Adorno,
1970, p. 149, modified translation)
Integration and adaptation were central social values for functionalist theories, both for consensus and for conflict
theories. For both, ultimately, the importance of the “good functioning of the social machinery” prevails. Adorno, for
his part, claimed that the process of integration was potentially disintegrative: “… total socialization objectively hatches
its opposite, and there is no telling yet whether it will be a disaster or a liberation” (Adorno, 2004, p. 346). Therefore,
so-called social progress can have both a catastrophic unfolding, like fascism, or an emancipatory one.7 Dialectically
speaking, the “totally administered world” carries its opposite term, which sooner or later will break through.
Thesepredictions regarding thedevelopment of late capitalismare striking insofar as they areboth counterintuitive
for their time and revealing for our own. Adorno did not experience the economic crises of the 1970s, nor the neolib-
eral offensive of the 1980s, but he did, in a sense, foresee the decline of social pacification mechanisms. In this sense,
one could say that this is not merely a “pessimistic diagnosis” in a context of (apparent) social peace, but rather a rare
comprehension of social determinants. Only some years after Adornowrote could the “disintegrative character” of the
“total administrative world” be clearly seen.
By overlooking the structural antagonism in society, the very cause of potential disintegration is disregarded. “But
objective antagonism has not disappeared with integration. Only its manifestation in struggle has been neutralized”
(GS 8, p. 154). After all, it is not because the objective class struggle “became virtually invisible”—in Bertolt Brecht’s
expression which is referred to by Adorno and Jaerisch—that it ceased to exist. In Adorno’s words: “All society is
still class society as it was in the times when its concept came up; the excessive pressure in the Eastern states indi-
cates that it is no different there” (GS 8, p. 14). However, Adorno and Jaerisch admitted that the integration process
of the labor classes in central Europe and in the United States expressed conflict theory’s true content. For Adorno,
the disruptive forces in society were effectively captured and neutralized by the fully administered world (Nachge-
lassene Schriften [NS] IV.15, 80). This diagnosis is very similar to JürgenHabermas’ in Technology and Science as “Ideology”
(1968):
State-regulated capitalism, which has emerged from a reaction to the systemic dangers created by open class
antagonism, puts the class conflict at a standstill. The system of late capitalism is defined by a policy of compen-
sation, i.e. conflict avoidance, which secures the loyalty of the wage-dependent masses, to such an extent that
the conflict built into the structure of societywith the exploitation of private capital is the one that remains latent
with the greatest probability. (Habermas apud Krysmanski, 1971, p. 107)
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Conflicts were successfully internalized by the welfare state through its policies of compensation and its juridical
capacity tomediate any tension. As Habermas very accurately observed, it was a reaction to the threat that open class
antagonism still posed, and in this sense, social conflict theory expressed the necessity of social integration for a well-
functioningmachinery.8 As Adorno and Jaerisch noted:
The integration of the class struggle by the institutionalization of associations and parties, competing with each
other establishes the scheme of conflict theories that, at the same time, affirms and minimizes [entschärfende]
the conflict. (GS 8, p. 181)
Thus, conflict theories express an objective aspect of reality: the institutionalization of the conflict and its neutraliza-
tion. Even if its descriptive capacity is remarkable, it is an ideological expression, since it serves themaintenance of this
pacified reality, and not its rupture. Revolution is not on the horizon any longer, only conflict management. Unlike the
Marxist theory of social conflict, modern conflict theory does not aim to elaborate a theory of revolution, but a theory
of government. Dahrendorf, perhaps themost representative theorist of the conflict theory, stated: “Liberal democracy
is the government through conflict” (Dahrendorf, 1965, p. 174). According to this conception, conflict is the condition
of possibility of the social system, as well as the very condition of progress. Progress, structure, and conflict are inter-
dependent elements: without the structural basis, conflicts cannot be productive; likewise, a social structure without
conflict become paralyzed and cannot progress.
Because Parsons longed to preserve structures, he overlooked processes. As Charles Mills put it: “The magical
elimination of conflict, and the wondrous achievement of harmony, remove from this ‘systematic’ and ‘general’
theory the possibilities of dealing with social change, with history” (Mills, 1968, p. 42). Conflict theory, in its turn, is
the attempt to push functionalism to a dynamic conception of conflict: no longer understanding it as dysfunctional
or undesirable, but as an impulse for progressive movement. During a lecture in 1968 in his course Introduction to
Sociology, Adorno commented on the connection between conflict and progress in relation to conflict theory as
follows:
… the core of this theory is that without conflict, namely without the antagonism of interests, something like
progress does not take place, social stagnation takes place. Therefore the dispute itself, the conflict of interests
itself, is to be affirmed as the constituent, so to speak, of living social life. (Nachgelassene Schriften [NS IV.15],
p. 115)
Finally, forAdorno, the conflictwithin the liberal democracy leads to the simple reproductionof the same (immer gleich),
since it always expresses and reproduces the fundamental antagonism in the capitalist society. “Reality produces the
semblance of developing upward and remains au fond what it was” (Adorno, 2005, p. 156). “Progress” is thus confined
to the same totality, fromwhich true progress would be able to come out. “In this experience of terror, the terror of the
system forcibly coalesces into appearance; the more the system expands, the more it hardens into what it has always
been” (Adorno, 2005, p. 160). Because neutralized conflict can bemanaged, it constitutes the condition for progress: a
progress that is merely the repetition of the same.
4 CLAUSTROPHOBIA OF THE WORLD
In addition to having sensed the decline of the system of the pacification of conflicts, Adorno and Jaerisch provided
a new element of analysis: the subjective dimension of the phenomenon of social disintegration. After all, the antag-
onism mediates all social phenomena and leave traces in subjectivity, in which it can come up as a symptom. In other
words, social antagonism constitutes subjectivity and can find different means of expression. It can appear as anguish,
coldness or “a claustrophobia of the world”—psychological states that are eventually hypostatized by philosophy into
AFSHAR 505
“existentials,” as it occurs in theworkofHeidegger. These symptomsare thus viewedas a result of the social integration
process:
The conflict, invisible beneath the surface of the partnership [Partnertums], is expressed in marginal social phe-
nomena: sometimes where integration has not yet been fully realized, sometimes in the ‘dregs of the world of
phenomena’ [Abhub der Erscheinungswelt], from which the antagonistic process distances us; sometimes in
the irrational explosions of those who are entirely immanent to society, either as workers or consumers. (GS 8,
p. 188)
Despite the positivity of conflict brought about by the idea of “social partnership,” contradictions can erupt through
“marginal social phenomena,” described here by the Freudian expression “dregs of theworld of phenomena”9 and “irra-
tional explosions.” In these elements, social antagonism seems to be able to break through the ideology of pacification
by manifesting itself in psychic life. This eruption can occur in those for whom “integration has not been fully realized”
as much as in those who are “entirely immanent with society.”
In “Society,” Adorno points to the sacrificial element of integration and its affective consequences: “Thewhole busi-
ness keeps creaking and groaning on, with unspeakable sacrifices [mit unsäglichen Opfern, Y. A.], only on account of the
profit motive and the interiorization by individuals of the breach torn in society as a whole” (Adorno, 1970, p. 149,
modified translation). In addition to sacrifice, individuals are constantly afraid of being ejected from the social system.
In the article “Sociology and Psychology,” Adorno suggests that the fear of being “déclassé” (Deklassierung)—that is, of
falling in class and social status—generates social resentment towards those who could not integrate “optimally” and
are relegated down the social ladder:
Today anyonewho fails to comply with the economic rules will seldom go under straight away. But the fate of the
déclassé looms on the horizon. Ahead lies the road to an asocial, criminal existence: the refusal to play the game
arouses suspicions and exposes offenders to the vengeance of society even though they may not yet be reduced
to going hungry and sleeping under bridges. But the fear of being cast out, the social sanctions behind economic
behavior, have long been internalized along with other taboos, and have left their mark on the individual. In
the course of history this fear has become second nature; it is not for nothing that the word ‘existence’ in usage
uncontaminated by philosophy means equally the fact of being alive and the possibility of self-preservation in
the economic process. (Adorno, 1968, p. 71)
In other words, the subject who submits to “unspeakable sacrifices” for the sake of integration perceives the nonin-
tegrated as a threat to his own situation. Thus, integration is not perceived as a desirable alternative, but rather as
an injunction. The individual is constrained to internalize moral expectations of conformity as if they were his own.
According to Adorno, what prevails in the process of sociability is not the defense of one’s own interests, but the fear
of perishing, of social sanction and of physical coercion. He connects this with the rationalization of economy:
A firm belief in the transparent rationality of the economy is, no less than the presumption that psychology is
the sufficient ground of men’s actions, a typical piece of bourgeois self-deception. This rationality is based on
physical coercion, on bodily torment, a material moment that transcends both immanently economic “material
incentives” and the intrapsychic instinctual economy. (Adorno, 1968, p. 71–72)
Unlike the functionalist conception that holds integration to take place through a rational and peaceful consensus,
Adorno states that it does not cease to act on individual behaviors in the form of suffering. In Negative Dialectics,
Adorno affirms that “suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expres-
sion, is objectivelymediated [vermiettelt, Y.A.]” (Adorno, 2004, pp. 16–17,modified translation). Social objectivity is the
set of relations that both mediates subjectivity and is external to the spontaneity of the subjects. It can be described
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as “system” and implies something that individuals should only react to, something that they simply suffer and not
something on which they are able to act. The objectivity of the system appears, thus, as destiny. But the suffering that
underpins the functionality of social roles can cause its own collapse.
4.1 Final remarks: The open society and its enemies
Compensation mechanisms and better bargaining conditions for the workers movement have been implemented as
a contentious policy. By institutionalizing conflicts, the structure of the welfare state developed a managerial way of
dealingwith social contradictions, which turned out to be extremely successful in carrying this out. Academic sociology
was largely used as instrument for social engineering during the 1950s and 1960s, the period in which conflict theory
emerged. Its fundamental goal was to the assist governments and bureaucracies in order to deactivate tensions among
workers andother social groups.However, during thepast threedecades, this politicalmodel came tobeexhausted and
Adorno’s statement about the potential disintegrative character of late capitalist societies seems to bepertinent today.
Integration bonds such as the internalization of norms and conformity expectations are in crisis. “Anti-establishment”
movements in the last years express the fact thatmanagerial solutions for social conflicts are innocuous. In some cases,
this crisis is being experienced as a strong disintegration tendency of society, or as a “great regression” (Geiselberger,
2017). The idea of progress, a constitutive element of both the experience of postwar “golden years” and the postwar
sociology, is also in decline. Confidence in the future has been shattered, and the idea of regression is looming in its
place.
Axel Honneth (2012) described the decline of the Parsonian structures as the brutalization of social conflict, in which
the spheres ofmutual recognition (law, economy, and family) cannot provide the samecompensation as before. Accord-
ing to Honneth, Parsons assumed that the legal system would secure more extensive rights for a large segment of the
population, which showed itself to be an illusion (p. 12). On a second level, the performance principle, which would
guarantee fair competition for professional recognition ended up being deformed by the deregulation of labor and
unemployment (p. 13). Finally, the transformation of the role of genders within the family and the alteration of their
functions on the division of labor had an impact on themoral expectations within this sphere.
On the whole, the network of institutionalized spheres of recognition simply looks nothing like what Parsons
predicted. If one were to resort to generalized developmental patterns to describe the new state, then it would
seem obvious to speak of a process of growing exclusion from the systems of recognition and the simultaneous
loss of the principles on which they rest. (Honneth, 2012, p. 15)
For Honneth, this new state of affairs expresses an anomic situation, as normatively justified satisfaction for recogni-
tion strivings is no longer possible in the “spheres of action.” In other words, the “brutalization of social conflict” ends
up in the exclusion of an increasing number of people from the standard Parsonian spheres of mutual recognition. This
tendency to anomy is due to the exhaustion of the compensation mechanisms that supported the previous social pact.
Phenomena such as structural unemployment, which have resulted in the increasing superfluity of parts of the work
force, need to be placed at the center of this discussion. In 1967, during a lecture on the newextreme rightmovements,
Adorno presents the thesis which “he developed in all of his works of the last 8 years”:
… despite full employment and despite all these symptoms of prosperity, the spectre of technological unem-
ployment continues to haunt us to such an extent that in the age of automation, (…)even those people who
are involved in the production process already feel themselves to be potentially superfluous—but I put it in very
extreme terms—to be potentially unemployed. (Adorno, 2019, p. 12).
The new fear of being “deklasiert” is something that Adorno discusses several times in the late 1960s but in this confer-
ence he explicitly describes it as the soil for the resurgence of fascism. This disintegrative process may be understood
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socially—as crisis—but also subjectively—as suffering. Objectively, however, it is no longer possible to go back to the
system of compensations of the postwar period. As Habermas pointed out, the postwar social pact was only possible
as long as economic growth was sustainable. Besides, because the system already contained its disintegration poten-
tiality, it seems to be impossible to restore the social order of the welfare state.
Finally, postponing the confrontationwith the capitalistic fissionmeans to deepen it. As Adorno pointed out, even if
the combination of maximal efficiency and minimal social conflict proved to have a successful outcome, the structural
wounds of society would not be healed; they would merely be plastered over. The threat of disintegration, each day
sharper in our societies, cannot be responded to with the neutralization of structural contradictions anymore.
NOTES
1 In fact, Parsons had a significantly different position on thismatter after 1937. At that time, he considered differentiation and
rationalization features for destabilizing, polarizing, and antidemocratic effects of social systems. By that time, he repeatedly
took Germany as a model. In his later works, however, his perspective changed. “After 1947, Parsons took the United States
as the type case for his studies of social change, relegation Nazi Germany to the status of deviant case” (Alexander, 1995,
p. 50). In otherwords, in the late1940s, Parsons started toperceive stratification anddifferentiation as natural consequences
of the system’s complexification.
2 One of the fundamental theses of The great transformation (1944) is that capitalism has never been realized as a total freedom
of markets. Polanyi argues that impulses for “social protection” since the 19th century have been fundamental to contain
the self-destructive fury ofmonopolistic capitalism. “Therewas nothing natural about laissez-faire; freemarkets could never
have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton manufactures—the leading free trade
industry—were created by the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire itself was
enforced by the state” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 145).
3 “Awareof having crossed the lineof ahemisphere—not that theyhavebeenable to see as they crossed it a cord stretchedover
the ocean warning them of their passage, but that little by little they have been led into a new hemisphere by the progress of
their ship” (Jaurès [1903] apud Rodgers, 1998, p. 17).
4 The background for this diffusion is the so-called “Re-education Program,” implemented between 1946 and 1947, during
the American occupation. Helmut Schelsky referred to it in 1959 as the “upswing of empirical sociology after 1945 in West
Germany” and described it as a “mission success of the sociology” from the USA (Schelsky1959], p. 55 apudWeyer, 1986).
5 Adorno addressed Simmel’s formalism and its influence over the “sociology of conflict” in a lecture in May 1968 during the
course Introduction to Sociology (Nachgelassene Schriften [NS IV.15], pp. 113–118).
6 It is worth remembering that Karl Popper’s The open society and its enemieswas published in 1945 and claimed a liberal and
flexible conception of society, perfectly compatible with themanagerial model of Coser’s conflict theory.
7 Karl Polanyi makes a similar argument. He claims that the doublemovement—produced by the opposition between the pres-
sure for the liberalization of the market and the efforts for social protection—can lead to socialism or to fascism. “Fascism,
like socialism, was rooted in amarket society that refused to function” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 248).
8 Moreover, the concept of conflict is well way far from Hegel’s battle to the death between master and slave. “It is solely by
risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare
existence, is not themerely immediate form inwhich it at firstmakes its appearance, is not itsmere absorption in the expanse
of life” (Hegel, 1949, p. 233). Here the opponents struggle for their lives, in such a way that only one can prevail, whereas in
modern conflict theory the outcome of the confrontation can only be accommodation.
9 This expression appears in the lecture given by Freud in 1915 on parapraxes (Fehlleistungen, faulty acts). “It is true that psy-
choanalysis cannot boast that it has never concerned itself with trivialities. On the contrary, thematerial for its observations
is usually provided by the inconsiderable events which have been put aside by other sciences as being too unimportant—the
dregs, onemight say, of the world of phenomena” (Freud, 1981, p. 27).
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